To inhibit or not to inhibit
AL S. VITANGCOL III
FORMER senator Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. was the guest last week in our weekly News And Nuances Kapihan at Almusalan (NANKA) media forum. One of the questions that I asked him was about the extremely urgent motion to inhibit that he personally filed early this month before the Supreme Court, sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET).
In that motion, Marcos sought the recusal of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguiao from taking charge of his electoral protest case now pending before the PET. He said: “I was hesitant and has always advised against it.”
The motion was signed by Marcos himself. Lawyer Romulo Macalintal took a swipe at that. In media reports, Macalintal said: “The motion appears to have been prepared by his lawyer but only Mr. Marcos signed it. This shows that even his lawyers could not sign the motion, that his lawyers themselves do not believe that he has a valid ground for voluntary inhibition.”
As a lawyer, that is understandable. No lawyer, who looks upon his professional future, will advise his client to file a recusal of a sitting judge or justice. It reminded me of a personal case wherein I wanted to file a motion for inhibition. Yet, my lawyer prevented me from filing one. So, I drafted a scholarly urgent motion to inhibit and re-raffle, but in the end decided not to file it all.
Why is that so? The filing of a motion to inhibit a judge is a like a sword of Damocles. It can cut through the movant himself. It is not farfetched that the mere filing of a motion for inhibition may itself breed contempt and bias against the litigant, where there was none before. This is so possible especially if the judge will not recuse himself after all.
Justice Cruz article
In my research on the subject of judges’ recusal, I came across an article written by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz. Its title is “To inhibit or not to inhibit,” from which the title of this column was lifted.
Justice Cruz wrote: “Arguably, every member of the bench has, at one point or another, been faced with a motion to inhibit himself from hearing or deciding a case. Meritorious or not, a prayer for recusal has a way of ruffling a judge’s equanimity as it is, after all, an ostensible attack on his ability to exercise his judgment fairly and independently. More than just a remedial matter, the inhibition of judges is grounded on the party-litigant’s constitutional right to due process. The Bill of Rights provides that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. And inherent in this principle is the right to be heard by a disinterested and impartial judge.
“However, there are cases where the motion to inhibit is clearly borne of personal prejudice, hostility or groundless suspicions. Worse, parties and counsel have not found it beneath themselves to resort to this tactic to delay or railroad the proceedings or to find a more sympathetic judge. It is these cunning attempts to manipulate the administration of justice that behooves the members of the bench to be ever vigilant and guard against undue pressure intended to undermine the integrity of the judicial process.
“Indeed, it is quite a tall order to summon objectivity in the face of an attack on one’s competence, but this is a reality every judge must deal with. Having answered the call to administer justice and uphold the law at all times, a judge must, when faced with possible disqualification, learn to stand back, sift through the issues and distinguish between mere diatribe and real concerns about his ability to decide a case fairly. It takes strength of character, humility and wisdom to acknowledge that sometimes, no matter how good and pure his intentions are, a judge’s relationships, past declarations or actions and personal beliefs may get in the way of his ability to render justice.”
A passage from the decision in the 2001 case of People v. Kho is worth quoting here:
“Judges may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. x x x He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his decision to sit or not to sit may depend to a great extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of law who forestalls the miscarriage of justice.”
Indeed, justices should avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. t is essential that judges be above suspicion. It bears stressing that the duty of judges is not only to administer justice but also to conduct themselves in a manner that would avoid any suspicion of irregularity.
Hence, any act which would give the appearance of impropriety becomes, of itself, reprehensible.
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