Focus shifts to termination of the communist insurgency
Credit to Author: YEN MAKABENTA| Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 16:45:33 +0000
First word
IN the book, Force and Statecraft by Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995), the authors, one a historian of international affairs and the other a distinguished political scientist, make this startling claim:
“Students of military strategy have not given much systematic attention to the problem of terminating wars, and military planners have also traditionally neglected these problems, concentrating upon how to start wars and fight them successfully, rather than upon how to end them. Japanese leaders, for example, developed an ingenious plan for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor but had no notion of how the resulting war with the United States might be concluded.”
The armed forces and the government find themselves today in much the same predicament as the Japanese in fighting the twin armed challenges to the Philippine state — the 50-year-old communist insurgency, and the just-as-old Muslim secessionist rebellion in Mindanao.
By nearly every indicator in the conflicts, the Armed Forces of the Philippines has fought its way to the cusp of victory in the test of arms with both groups.
But then, while so close to defeating both insurgencies, the government still cannot fully terminate the strife and liberate the nation from both scourges.
It is striking that both insurgencies are coming to a head during the current term of President Rodrigo Duterte.
The challenge to his government now is how to terminate both conflicts expeditiously, before the baton passes on to his successor in 2022.
War termination
Craig and George devote a major chapter in their book specifically to the subject of “war termination.”
They specifically chose the term “war termination” not peace in their discussion.
“One must distinguish,” they said, “between a mere cessation of hostilities and a peace agreement that attempts to resolve the conflicting aims over which the battle has been waged. Hostilities may end with a ceasefire or armistice that leaves the issues at stake unsettled and defers their consideration to a later peace conference.”
On the question of what strategists and planners should do when things do not go according to plan, the authors wrote:
“Wars or conflicts are often prolonged as a result of military estimates that prove too optimistic regarding the expected effectiveness of one’s military strategy and unrealistically downgrade the capabilities and will of the opponent.
“What factors set into motion and facilitate efforts to terminate a conflict?
“Generally speaking, a belligerent side will not consider ending the conflict unless it stands to realize the minimum goals for which it has been fighting. But it must also have the resources and the will to continue fighting for its minimally acceptable outcome.
“The process of reevaluation will take place on both sides, until the two sides agree that settling for less than they had hoped for is preferable to continuing hostilities.
“War termination typically involves not one but a number of important issues on which both the two sides disagree: such as, the timing and conditions of a ceasefire, the disposition of territories, the withdrawal of forces, and provisions for reparations.
“The ideal outcome of course is a peace agreement between the two sides.”
The need for statecraft
In response to a request from a friend, I wrote sometime last year a brief paper on the communist insurgency and the riddle of terminating it.
I will use in this column some of the thoughts I raised in that essay.
The first point I raised in my discussion is that skillful and effective statecraft has been missing from the government policy and strategy in ending the communist insurgency.
What is statecraft? Statecraft is the use of the assets or the resources and tools (economic, military, intelligence, media) that a state has to pursue its interests and to affect the behavior of others, whether friendly or hostile. It involves making sound assessments and understanding where and on what issues the state is being challenged and can counter a threat or create a potential opportunity or take advantage of one.
Statecraft requires good judgment in the definition of one’s interest and a recognition of how to exercise military or soft economic power to provide security and promote the well-being of one’s citizens.
It is a mistake for any government or president to enter negotiations — even if he thinks it is largely for show — without a vision and an understanding of acceptable outcomes. Once in a negotiation, there are political costs for walking away. The longer a negotiating process goes, the more it tends to justify itself — and the more one must not lose sight of its initial purpose.
Duterte concessions misjudged
The failure of the negotiations with the Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA) under President Duterte is due principally to poor statecraft on the government side. Government negotiators did not have a clear vision of an acceptable outcome from the talks; they withered in the face of the intransigence and clear-eyed objectives of the communist side.
The government got very little in return from the enormous concessions that President Duterte granted to the communists in order to get the negotiations moving, notably:
1. President Duterte’s decision to appoint nominees from the communists to his initial Cabinet, involving no less than four portfolios.
2. DU30’s decision to allow the provisional release of communist political detainees to enable them to serve as consultants for the communist side in the negotiations.
3. Extension of political space in the parliamentary arena to communist party-list front organizations and their designated representatives.
These major concessions were misjudged as signs of weakness on the part of government; the communists used them as a springboard to expand their ranks and mount fresh NPA attacks on military and police forces. They thought Duterte would be another Cory Aquino.
Delusion about ‘peace talks’
The government policy and strategy in the negotiations has been wrongfooted by a delusional idea of the magical efficacy of peace talks. This thinking is a legacy from the Benigno Aquino 3rd government and its Church supporters, which created the office of the presidential adviser on the peace process.
DU30 can infuse new purpose and vigor in the government’s policy toward the insurgency with a change in focus:
1. Dropping “peace talks” totally from its vocabulary in dealing with the CPP-NPA, whether formally or informally. “Peace” should only enter the picture when a settlement is ready for signature.
2. Adopting “war termination” as the explicit and only acceptable outcome in the resolution of the communist insurgency.
The change in terminology will effect a sea change in the public’s perception of the President’s iron resolve to end once and for all the 50-year-old communist insurgency.
This will crown the President’s decision to call off peace talks permanently and to dissolve the government peace panel.
This means that the government should utilize its massive superiority of firepower and command of resources to mount unrelenting pressure on the CPP, NPA and the National Democratic Front to shift their attention toward the termination of the insurgency.
The isolation of Jose Maria Sison and other communist leaders in the Netherlands and the surrender of so many NPA groups at local level point to a decisive reduction of strength of the armed struggle.
Relentless action to stop NPA capacity to mount attacks against government forces, uproot revolutionary taxation in the countryside, curtail the activities of communist front organizations in Congress and the media will collectively sap the will of the insurgents to carry on the armed struggle.
A “no quarter given” approach to the insurgency, coupled with a forceful communications campaign on the futility of the communist cause and ideology should pull the rug from under the rebellion.
Communist leaders must be told that the only discussion possible now between government and the insurgency should be “surrender” or “war termination.”
President Marcos did it with the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, and got them to surrender.
President Duterte should do the same with the CPP-NPA.
yenmakabenta@yahoo.com.
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