Academic freedom: For the academy, not for academicians?
Credit to Author: JOSEPH NOEL M. ESTRADA| Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 17:49:36 +0000
THE principle of “academic freedom” is part of the culture of Philippine education, being influenced largely by American education. But what does academic freedom mean for the institutions and professors? Our Constitution implies that the benefits of academic freedom are, to borrow the words of the US Supreme Court, “vested in the academy, not in the academicians.” But if we trace the concept of institutional academic freedom, it was derived from the individual academic freedom of professors which refers to their freedom to adopt their own teaching methods, techniques, and to pursue the truth free from external and internal control subject only to reasonable limitations.
In one of my meetings with some university presidents, one of them in a light manner argued against the principle of institutional academic freedom in the Constitution, calling it a “misnomer” and an “abomination” to genuine academic freedom which, according to him, resides in individual faculty, not in the institution. The friendly but passionate debate prompted me to respond: “If I were to say that, I’d be cited in contempt by our Supreme Court for casting aspersion on its landmark cases I just enumerated defining institutional academic freedom.”
But there may be some truth to the statement of this university president. In many cases, we have seen that academic freedom enjoyed by educational institutions is at odds with the idea of the professor’s academic freedom in class. The right of the institution to regulate the teaching methods of the professor is immediately apparent in one of the essential freedoms subsumed in academic freedom which is “how it shall be taught.” This ostensible inconsistency finds support in a case decided by the US Supreme Court involving a higher education institution where it noted that, “academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decision-making by the academy itself”. (Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 US 214).
At any rate, here’s a case study where both the academy and the academician’s academic freedom are recognized:
‘Ghost students’
A graduate school professor in a state university was the subject of several complaints for having “ghost students” in his Doctor of Education (Ed.d) class. These were students who were granted a special arrangement on attendance so that they were not required to attend regular classes, but were given grades at the end of the course. A fellow professor filed a complaint with the board of regents of the state university.
The board of regents, however, sided with the respondent professor and upheld the grades given to the students. Reference was made on a policy under the University Code which provides that rules on attendance of students shall be enforced in all classes subject to the modification by the Dean in the case of graduate students and other courses. The respondent professor, at the time he was handling the graduate class in Ed.d, had already been appointed OIC of the graduate school. Hence, he was entitled to do “modification” as the University Code allows.
In the case for graft filed against the professor and the university officials, the Supreme Court affirmed their exoneration from criminal and administrative charges by the Ombudsman. It held that academic freedom clothes the professor with the widest latitude to innovate and experiment on the method of teaching which is most fitting to his students (graduate students at that), subject only to the rules and policies of the university.
The Supreme Court recognized the primacy of academic freedom in regard to higher institutions of learning when the university in this case validated the teaching style of the professor. “Institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives and the methods on how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds: who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”
The court also cited academic freedom accorded to a faculty member which pertains to the right to pursue his studies in his particular specialty. It is defined as a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalty because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution.
Please read in full the case of Camacho v. Coresis, Jr., GR 134372, [Aug. 22, 2002], 436 PHIL 449-462)
The author is the corporate secretary and legal counsel of The Manila Times, and the managing partner of Estrada & Aquino Law, Co. He is also the legal counsel of the Coordinating Council of Private Educational Associations (COCOPEA), Catholic Educational Association of the Philippines (CEAP), Phil. Association of Private Schools, Colleges, and Universities (PAPSCU), Philippine Accrediting Association of Schools, Colleges, & Universities (PAASCU), and the Asian Association of School HRMD Practitioners, Inc. (AASHPI).
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