Why ASEAN stays silent on South China Sea ruling 8 years on
Credit to Author: Cristina Chi| Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2024 11:48:00 +0800
MANILA, Philippines — After major clashes between Chinese and Filipino vessels, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has been trying to marshal support from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to take a more active role and lead diplomatic proceedings to ease tensions in the region.
The president has so far been consistent in invoking "ASEAN centrality," suggesting the regional bloc be the primary driver of negotiations and conflict resolution among countries with competing territorial claims in the South China Sea.
Countries in ASEAN, in Marcos' words, must "resoundingly [reject] misguided interpretations that paint our region as a mere theater of geopolitical rivalries," according to his speech delivered at the last Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia's premier defense summit.
Meanwhile, ASEAN has remained largely muted about the 2016 Hague ruling that rejected China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea as having no basis in international law, choosing instead to call for peace, security and stability with respect to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
What is keeping the 10-member bloc of Southeast Asian nations silent, and what does this mean for the Marcos administration's plan to tap more regional allies to counter Chinese intimidation?
Out of the 26 governments that have publicly called for the 2016 ruling to be respected, the Philippines is the only Southeast Asian nation among them, according to the latest tracker of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative as of November 2023.
"ASEAN naturally has a hard time making a collective stand on the SCS issue because member states have divergent interests and economic dependence on China," Justin Baquisal, a geopolitical analyst for FACTS Asia told Philstar.com.
Some ASEAN members have chosen to prioritize their relationship with China, making them hesitant to challenge Beijing's intimidation to protect their own national interests, he added.
Not all ASEAN members, moreover, have a stake in South China Sea's legal issues. Of the 10 ASEAN members, only four are official claimants against China, namely the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei.
Julio Amador III, FACTS founder and the head of a geopolitical consultancy, said the Philippines' decision to downplay the arbitral ruling under then-President Rodrigo Duterte has contributed to ASEAN's subdued response.
In 2021, Duterte undermined the Philippines' legal win against China in an attempt to court more Chinese loans and investments, calling the Hague ruling a mere "piece of paper" he can "throw away."
"Since the Philippines was not going to be loud about it, the ASEAN member-states may have decided that it was not in their best interest to be more robust on the topic if the Philippines was not going to do so," Amador told Philstar.com.
"If you look at the joint communiques and [statements] by the chairperson, there were some vague references to international law, and UNCLOS occasionally," he added.
But the Philippines is not isolated in its attempts to stand up against China's increasing encroachment on its maritime areas.
Baquisal said: "Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam have repeatedly asserted the need for a rules-based resolution of disputes; like the Philippines, Vietnam has asserted the primacy of UNCLOS, which is the basis for the 2016 arbitration ruling."
During the Shangri-La Dialogue, where Marcos expressed his intent to continue working with ASEAN and China towards a code of conduct anchored in the UNCLOS, other Southeast Asian countries also "affirmed the need to be governed by UNCLOS."
"Obviously such an affirmation may be perceived by the Philippines as too non-committal and evades the issue of China's violations of UNCLOS. Still, even if ASEAN countries do not directly support the Philippines, I think the regional climate now has more awareness about UNCLOS," Baquisal said. "It will take time – possibly years – for the region to slowly make assertions consistent with UNCLOS and the 2016 ruling."
The analyst also cited Vietnam as an example of a country that may not directly condemn China for its actions, but remains open to engaging in maritime delimitation talks with Philippines for a diplomatic solution to their competing claims in the contested waters.
"So even if Vietnam does not actively confront China, the fact that it is willing to use UNCLOS to amicably settle with the Philippines is a victory for the Philippines too — that Southeast Asia understands that there is no way to go forward but with rule of law rather than coercion," he said. "There is a normative statement there, and it's a message for China."
While Southeast Asian nations have varying economic and political interests to protect, Amador said the arbitral award stands to benefit all ASEAN member-states by invalidating China's invisible nine-dash line.
Nowadays, the Philippines has to work doubly hard to ensure that the arbitration will be included in the ASEAN's joint communiques and statements issued by the chairperson, Amador said.
Fresh from its legal victory, the Philippines in 2016 tried to push for the arbitration ruling to be included in the ASEAN's joint communique against China's territorial expansion in the region. In the end, the ruling was left out of the joint communique after Cambodia, a staunch ally of Beijing, rejected its wording. This led the Philippines to back down from the effort.
Baquisal said that China is banking on a "divide-and-conquer approach" with ASEAN members, who are expected to agree on the lowest common denominator on any issue. This is "hard to achieve for contentious issues like the South China Sea maritime disputes," the analyst added.
Amador said the Philippines should take a more active role in promoting awareness of the 2016 arbitral ruling within ASEAN through public diplomacy efforts such as forums and workshops.
For Baquisal, the Philippines can also explore avenues for cooperation with other ASEAN members like Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, while being "realistic of the limits of partnership."
"For example Indonesia and Vietnam have foreign policies of non-alignment, so realistically they will never become a military partner like what the United States is to the Philippines," the analyst said. "But it's worth exploring avenues where we can productively grow the relationship with them."