Trump Acts on Critical Infrastructure Resiliency Against EMP Events
Credit to Author: Sonal Patel| Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 21:44:45 +0000
President Trump has signed an executive order (EO) to boost coordination and national resilience to electromagnetic pulse (EMP) threats—both from nuclear warfare and natural events like solar superstorms.
Senior Trump administration officials from the from the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Energy—who took the unusual step in asking not be named—on March 26 told reporters on a call that the administration is taking “concrete steps” to address EMP threats. These steps are designed to protect key systems, networks, and assets that are “most at risk from EMP events in a dynamic threat environment,” they said.
A DOE official added that the steps are designed to reduce the risk that EMPs pose on U.S. critical infrastructure and its asset network—including power plants and the grid.
The EO essentially directs multiple federal agencies to coordinate to increase national resilience to EMPs. “This includes clear roles and responsibilities for departments and agencies to facilitate action to improve information-sharing between federal and non-federal stakeholders, including assessing and developing, if necessary, EMP standards, and circulating testing results, so that the standards are well-informed by the best science that we have,” an NSC official said.
Agencies that will need to coordinate under the EO include the Departments of State, Defense, Interior, Commerce, Energy, Homeland Security, and Director of National Intelligence, which serves as the head of the intelligence community.
Coordination and development of executive branch actions will fall under the purview of the national security advisory and the NSC in consultation with the director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy.
‘Mechanisms to Enhance Private Sector’ Defenses Against EMPs Are Coming
Under the EO, the federal government will first move to identify critical functions and infrastructure at greatest risk from EMPs. It will then improve its understanding of EMPs, and evaluate “appropriate ways to mitigate the effects of an EMP or strengthen EMP critical infrastructure to stand against the effects of EMPs,” the DOE official said. Finally, it will formulate a response plan, “taking a whole government approach.”
“So, the [EO] is going to aid preparedness against EMPs events for increased public-private coordination and planning, including engaging critical infrastructure owners and operators to identify mechanisms to enhance private sector efforts,” a DHS official added.
Responding to a reporter’s question about why the administration was acting now, the NSC official said that the measure formalizes “an adequate security strategy that reflects the importance that we give to risks that are involved here, because of how they can impact critical infrastructure across the nation.” The DHS official noted while the DHS already has an EMP strategy that aligns well with the EO, it was crucial to officially forge intra-agency coordination.
The Ever-Present EMP Threat
Industry and academia have warned for years—and the DHS has internally recognized that—EMP events, and especially high-altitude EMP (HEMP) events resulting from detonation of a nuclear device, could severely damage critical electrical infrastructure like transformers.
EMP components are referred to as E1, E2, and E3. E1 is a “fast pulse” that primarily disrupts or damages electronic-based control systems, sensors, computers, and similar devices, but may also adversely affect long-line electrical systems. The E2 component is similar to lightning and has a similar ability to impair or destroy control features that are not protected from lightning. The E3 “slow pulse” component is a subsequent, slower-rising, longer-duration pulse that creates disruptive currents in transmission lines, which causes grid instability and increases heat in transformers. If the E3 pulse is high enough and long enough it can result in grid collapse and potentially damage transformers, experts warn.
Solar weather events of sufficient intensity can cause E3-type electromagnetic impacts. In 1989, for example, a geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) caused a regional grid collapse within 92 seconds in the Hydro-Quebec power system that left six million customers without power for up to nine hours. The threat of GMDs has been played up with good reason: Space weather researchers currently estimate a 6% to 12% chance that a Carrington-class storm—a solar storm comparable in size to the largest on record—is likely to hit the earth within the next 10 years. In July 2012, a storm of that magnitude missed Earth by about nine days, and only because it occurred on the far side of the sun, facing away from the Earth.
Meanwhile, a high-altitude burst nuclear test 900 miles from Hawaii in 1962 (a project known as Starfish Prime), offered “just a small taste of things to come,” as Dr. George Baker, professor emeritus at James Madison University and director for the foundation for resilient societies, testified on Feb. 27 before a Senate committee. “Consequences involve risk measurement units of millions of casualties (EMP Commission), trillions of dollars (Lloyds of London), and, dents in the history of civilization (Center for Policy on Emerging Technology). The good news is that well-known, effective, and practical engineering solutions are available to counter these threats. We have the engineering know- how and tools to protect ourselves. What is lacking is resolve,” he said.
While about 85% of critical electrical infrastructure is owned by private industry, the DHS, DOE, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) have addressed EMP and GMD risks, through standards and guidelines, research, strategy development, planning, and training. In 2001, Congress also established the EMP Commission, tasking it to assess the nature and magnitude of potential EMP threats to the U.S.
However, while government entities in the U.S. and Canada along with industry organizations, such as the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), have widely studied general threats posed to the grid from a severe GMD resulting from a solar storm, and to a lesser extent, threats posed by a HEMP, consensus is that more research is needed to inform assessments for specific mitigation measures by generators and transmission providers.
According to Baker, the private sector, meanwhile, “is not doing ver much of anything to address the EMP threat.” One reason for this, he noted, is an absence of federal EMP directives and standards for the electric power grid, which has resulted in “inconsistent industry interest, approaches and questionable protection effectiveness.” Baker added: “The NERC/electric industry EMP approach appears to be to let the national grid fail and concentrate attention, investments and preparedness on elaborate recovery plans to rebuild the grid in the aftermath of an EMP-caused grid collapse. This approach is fraught with risk.”
A few uncoordinated efforts exist, he noted, however. “Center Point, PJM, and Dominion Energy have each hardened a major control center. AEP has protected 400+ substation control shelters. Generation stations have not been addressed because of cost-recovery limitations (unlike transmission systems where federal regulations allow cost recovery),” he said.
“Notwithstanding, other than a beta-test of a GMD protection device for one transformer in Wisconsin, no hardening of the bulk power system’s high voltage, heavy duty, long-lead-time replacement items has occurred. The grid, in its current unhardened state, would likely be out of service for long periods following a major solar storm or EMP attack,” he said.
—Sonal Patel is a POWER associate editor (@sonalcpatel, @POWERmagazine)
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